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Abstract
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and
employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop
a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have
feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may
contain two types of incentives for the agent to work hard: a bonus and
a threat of dismissal. We find that good social relationships undermine
the credibility of a threat of dismissal but strengthen the credibility
of a bonus. Among others, these two mechanisms imply that better
social relationships sometimes lead to higher bonuses, while worse
social relationships may increase productivity and players’ utility in
equilibrium.
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1 Introduction
Incentive contracts for workers often do not rely on objective performance
measures only. Indeed, "thinking of any job in which subjective evaluation or
supervisor discretion does not play some role in incentives is difficult" (Gibbs
2012, p. 15). Subjective performance evaluation sometimes affects pay. For
example, 34% of employees in the industrial sector in the UK received some
form of merit pay "which depended on a subjective judgement by a super-
visor or manager of the individual’s performance" (quoted by MacLeod and
Malcomson (1998) from Millward et al. 1992, (p. 388)).1 However, the
use of subjective performance evaluation is not restricted to bonus pay only.
Managers and employees regularly have an understanding that the employ-
ment relationship is only continued if performance is satisfactory, which is
often a subjective matter. If the job is valuable to a worker, such a threat
of dismissal also works as an incentive device (Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984).
A prominent example is Henry Ford’s five-dollar-day program which almost
doubled wages (Raff and Summers 1987). Indirect evidence that many firms
use efficiency wages as an incentive device is that bonuses are more com-
mon when the unemployment rate is low, that is, when having a job is less
valuable to a worker (MacLeod and Parent 2000).
Subjective performance evaluation can overcome some well-known prob-
lems related to the use of objective performance measures, such as multi-
tasking concerns, measurement costs, and lack of flexibility. When such
problems are severe, managers may revert to ‘relational contracts’ in which
employee performance is evaluated subjectively in a holistic way (Gibbons
1998, Prendergast 1999). However, a difficulty with relational contracts is
that they cannot be enforced in court, but instead must be self-enforcing.
Promises and threats contained in a relational contract may therefore be
weak as they are constrained by their credibility. In recent decades, a rich
theoretical literature has developed studying the optimal design and use of
relational contracts (see among others Bull 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson
1989 and 1998, Baker et al. 1994, and Levin 2003).
The present paper contributes to this literature by studying how the qual-
ity of social relationships between managers and employees affects the opti-
mal design of relational contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic
principal-agent model where we assume that both players have some bargain-
ing power. The relational contract may contain two types of incentives for
the agent to work hard: a promise to pay a bonus for good performance as in
1See MacLeod and Parent (2000) and Gibbs et al. (2004) for similar evidence concerning
subjectively determined bonuses in other sectors.
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Baker et al. (1994), and a high wage combined with a threat of dismissal fol-
lowing bad performance (efficiency wages) as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).
Our key innovation is that we allow both players to have feelings of altruism
and/or spite toward each other. These feelings need not be symmetric. Our
analysis yields several potentially testable hypotheses on how vertical social
relationships in the workplace affect contract design.
So far, relational contracts have been studied abstracting from social re-
lationships between the contracting parties.2 This is somewhat surprising
given the prevalence of relational contracts in the workplace, as described
above, and the abundance of evidence for the existence of social relation-
ships between managers and employees. Surveys among managers reveal
that friendships between managers and employees occur frequently (see for
instance Berman et al. 2002). Furthermore, Agell (2004) reports that more
than 60% of managers in Sweden use good manger-employee relationships
to a great or fairly great extent for worker motivation. He concludes that
managers deem social relations a superior motivator to the standard tools dis-
cussed in agency theory. Similarly, Campbell and Kamlani (1997) find that
a large majority of US compensation managers deem good quality manager-
employee relations more important in determining effort than good working
conditions, high wages, and monitoring.3 There is also evidence for the oc-
currence of bad manager-employee relationships. Moerbeek and Need (2003)
report Dutch data showing that in eight percent of the jobs respondents had
in their lives, they got along with their manager badly or very badly. More
tentatively, Kahneman et al. (2004) report diary evidence from a US sample
of employed women showing that of all regular daily activities, respondents
dislike most to interact with their boss.4
The results of our analysis are as follows. Our first key result is that
better social relationships (meaning that either the principal, the agent, or
both are more altruistic) improve the credibility of a promise to pay a bonus,
2The only exception is the recent paper by Cordero Salas and Roe (2012) that considers
the case of an altruistic principal who may promise a bonus to a selfish agent. We discuss
this paper in the next section.
3In line with this, an extensive literature in organizational psychology has established a
strong positive correlation between the quality of the manager-employee relationship and
employee performance (see Gerstner and Day 1997, Rhoades and Eisenberger 2002, and
Wayne et al. 1997).
4There is also substantive laboratory evidence indicating that a majority of people are
altruistic, even to strangers (see among others Andreoni et al. 2008, Andreoni and Miller
2002, Charness and Haruvy 2002, Cox 2004, Cox et al. 2007, Gneezy et al. 2000, and
Leider et al. 2009). However, other people are actually spiteful. For instance, Andreoni
and Miller (2002) find that 55% of their sample is altruistic while 23% is spiteful (see
Beckman et al. 2002, Falk et al. 2005, and Fehr et al. 2011 for similar evidence).
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ceteris paribus. The reason is twofold. First, better social relationships
make the relational contract more valuable, which gives the principal stronger
incentives to adhere to it. Second, an altruistic principal partly internalizes
the benefits of the bonus to the agent, which reduces the principal’s costs of
honoring the contract.
The second key result is that better social relationships undermine the
credibility of a threat of dismissal. The intuition is that, as above, better
social relations make the employment relationship more valuable, also if the
worker shirks. As a consequence, the principal may find it attractive to retain
a worker with whom she has good ties even if the worker shirks, implying
that a threat of dismissal is not credible.
We find that social relationships have the following implications for op-
timal relational contracts. First, for very bad social relationships, players
don’t contract even though the economic surplus from trading is positive.
This holds because bad social relationships imply a social cost from entering
into an employment relationship.
Second, in the other extreme where social relationships are very good,
the agent is so altruistic that no incentives are required at all to make him
work hard. The reason is that an altruistic agent enjoys enriching the prin-
cipal. Hence, the optimal contract is a flat-wage contract without a threat
of dismissal that, nevertheless, results in high effort.
Third, for moderate social relationships both incentive types are credible.
In that case, the use of both incentives is sometimes necessary to induce high
effort. However, it can also happen that players are indifferent between using
both incentives or only one of them. The reason is that either the principal’s
rents may be so large that she can promise a high bonus which alone induces
high effort, or the agent’s job may be so valuable to him that only a threat
of dismissal provides sufficiently strong incentives, or both.
Fourth, for sufficiently good social relationships a threat of dismissal is
no longer credible and so the only available incentive is a promise to pay a
bonus. The optimal relational contract induces high effort through bonus
pay if the discount factor is sufficiently high. If the latter condition is not
satisfied, neither a threat of dismissal nor a bonus is credible, but players
still enter into an employment relationship. The reason is that, if a threat of
dismissal is not credible, it is by definition attractive to hire the agent even
if he shirks. Hence, the optimal contract has no incentives and results in low
effort.
Finally, starting from such a low-effort contract, we find two counterin-
tuitive comparative static results. First, better social relationships can lead
to higher bonuses. This follows directly from the first key result that better
social relationships improve the credibility of a bonus. Second, worse social
3
relationships can lead to higher effort. This holds because worse social rela-
tionships make a threat of dismissal credible, which implies that it becomes
possible to contract on high effort. As a result, a marginal deterioration of a
social tie can increase players’ utility in equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly discusses
related literature. Section 3 presents the model and section 4 contains the
main analysis and results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our model combines two strands in the literature: one on relational contracts
and one on social preferences in the workplace. As for the relational contracts
literature, our contribution is to study the impact of social relationships
between the principal and agent on the design of relational contracts. Our
paper is closely related to the seminal paper by MacLeod and Malcomson
(1989) who also study relational contracts that may consist of a bonus and
efficiency wages. One of their key results is that the self-enforceability of
relational contracts is independent of the type of incentives used, i.e. it does
not matter for the credibility of the contract whether some effort level is
sustained by a bonus, efficiency wages or a combination of these two. The
intuition is that any party earning rents is willing to make costs to uphold
the contract. A credible bonus hence requires the principal to earn rents,
whereas an efficiency wage contract must transfer rents to the agent. The
only requirement is that the rents are large enough for each player to be
willing to incur costs, be they payment of a bonus or cost of effort.
An implication of this result is that, if the principal has all the bargaining
power, she only offers a bonus and never efficiency wages because this allows
her to keep all the rents. However, if the agent has some bargaining power,
as in Cordero Salas (2011), the optimal contract contains both a bonus and
efficiency wages, and sometimes even only efficiency wages. The reason is that
the agent always earns a rent from employment. Importantly, bargaining does
not introduce other distortions and leaves the self-enforceability of relational
contracts intact. This holds because bargaining merely changes the division
of rents, not the size. Our assumption of bargaining hence allows a clear-cut
analysis of the impact of social relationships on relational contracts that may
include efficiency wages.
The effects of social relationships between principal and agent on rela-
tional incentive contracts is a topic that hardly received attention so far. To
the best of our knowledge, the only existing contribution is Cordero Salas and
Roe (2012) who study the case of an altruistic principal who may promise
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a bonus to a selfish agent. As in our analysis, the credibility of the bonus
increases in the principal’s altruism. Our paper differs in that we allow both
players to have feelings of altruism and spite. Moreover, as both players have
some bargaining power, the relational contract may contain efficiency wages.
Also related is Brown et al. (2004) who study relational contracts in the
laboratory. They formally derive, and confirm, the hypothesis that if some
unobserved fraction of agents is reciprocal, long-term relational contracts will
emerge that generate high effort levels, exhibit rent-sharing, and punish low
effort with dismissal. The reason is that principals pay rents in order to
motivate reciprocal agents which, in turn, gives selfish agents an incentive to
mimic reciprocal workers (see also Brown et al. 2008). Our paper differs in
that we assume that players are unconditionally altruistic or spiteful, types
are observable, and we focus on one principal-agent pair. Importantly, we
also allow the principal to have feelings of altruism or spite.
Much more attention has been devoted to the interaction between social
preferences and incentives in static models. The theoretical literature can be
divided into two groups of studies, one studying ‘horizontal’ social preferences
and the other studying ‘vertical’ social preferences. The first group focuses on
situations where people have social preferences towards others at the same
level in the organizational hierarchy, like in co-worker relationships.5 The
second group considers, as we do, social preferences towards people at a
different level in the hierarchy, like manager-employee relationships.
A seminal paper in the field is Prendergast and Topel (1996)’s model of
favoritism in organizations. In their principal-supervisor-agent model, the
supervisor subjectively evaluates the agent’s performance and reports this to
the principal. The supervisor’s report is the basis for the agent’s remunera-
tion. Further, the supervisor may be altruistic or spiteful towards the agent,
which leads him to distort his performance reports. In a static context,
Prendergast and Topel (1996) study a rich set of issues including optimal
performance pay for employees, the extent of the supervisor’s authority, and
the use of bureaucratic rules in pay and promotion decisions (see Prender-
gast 2002 and Giebe and Gürtler 2012 for interesting extensions). Lee and
5Models have been developed studying the effect of envy among employees on piece
rates (Bartling and Von Siemens 2010a), tournament incentives (Grund and Sliwka 2005,
Bartling 2011), team incentives (Rey-Biel 2008, Bartling and Von Siemens 2010b), and
relational incentives (Kragl and Schmid 2009, Kragl 2009 and 2011). Other models assume
horizontal inequity aversion and derive implications for optimal piece rates (Englmaier and
Wambach 2010, Neilson and Stowe 2010), tournament incentives (Itoh 2004, Ederer and
Patacconi 2010), and team incentives (Itoh 2004, Englmaier and Wambach 2010). Von
Siemens (2010 and 2011) study screening contracts for inequity averse workers. Lastly,
Rotemberg (1994) and Dur and Sol (2010) study how incentive contracts can affect em-
ployees’ willingness to invest in co-worker altruism.
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Persson (2011) also develop a three-layer model and allow for two-sided altru-
ism between supervisor and agent. They show that although a supervisor’s
altruism induces leniency, agent’s altruism induces loyalty such that social
relationships in the workplace may well be in the interest of the principal.
Moreover, they show that when social relationships intensify, the dominant
governance mode shifts from a controlling authority regime to a trusting
loyalty regime. We differ from these papers in two important ways. First,
we adopt a dynamic setting which allows us to study the impact of social
relations on relational incentives. Second, we focus on the case where the
manager is residual claimant, implying that the credibility of incentives be-
comes a concern.
In different contexts, Sliwka (2007), Shchetinin (2010), and Non (2012)
have studied incentive provision to altruistic employees by (possibly) altru-
istic managers. A common result — that we will also obtain in our analysis
— is that altruistic employees require a lower bonus as they enjoy enrich-
ing the principal. Analogously, Itoh (2004), Dur and Glazer (2008), and
Englmaier and Wambach (2010) study optimal incentive contracts for em-
ployees who are envious or inequity averse (that is, care about the differ-
ence between their manager’s and their own payoff).6 As in our analysis of
spiteful employees, such social preferences are a disincentive to provide ef-
fort. Pay-for-performance weakens this disincentive, as employee’s effort en-
riches the manager to a smaller extent. As compared to all of these studies,
our key innovation is to study pay-for-performance based on the manager’s
subjective evaluation, rather than on objective performance measures, in a
dynamic model. Contrary to received wisdom based on static models, our
dynamic model predicts that better social relationships sometimes lead to
higher bonuses rather than lower, because good social relationships function
as a credibility device.
3 The Model
We develop a principal-agent model where both players may be altruistic
or spiteful toward each other. Altruism and spite are modelled as the de-
pendence of a player’s utility on another player’s utility. Altruism and spite
apply to someone else’s total utility, possibly including an altruistic or spite-
ful part. This seems most natural as altruism and spite are a regard for
6See also Fehr and Schmidt (2000) and Fehr et al. (2007) who study whether a fair-
minded principal offers to a (potentially) fair-minded agent an explicit contract which
imposes a fine for low performance, an implicit contract promising a bonus for high per-
formance, or a trust contract consisting of a base salary only.
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someone’s well-being and not just part thereof.7 The utility of the principal
is given by8
Π =  +  ,
where  ≡  ()− is the principal’s profits,  is the agent’s compensation,
and  () is output which is a function of effort . The term  denotes
the altruistic part of utility where  is the agent’s utility and  denotes
the degree of the principal’s altruism. We call  the principal’s altruism
parameter. Similarly, the agent’s utility is given by
 = + Π,
where  ≡ − is the agent’s private utility, consisting of his compensation
minus effort costs. The term Π is the agent’s altruistic utility, where  is
the agent’s altruism parameter. Clearly, an altruism parameter below zero
reflects spite.
We assume that players know each other’s altruism parameter. Further,
we assume that neither player cares for the other’s utility as much, or more,
as he cares for his own utility; that is,   ∈ (−1 1). The players’ utility
functions — which are infinite recursions of each other — can therefore be
expressed as9
Π = 1
1−  ( + )  and  =
1
1−  (+ ) .
In each period that the agent is employed, he can exert low effort or high
effort, denoted by  ∈ {0 1}. Low effort results in low value of output,  = ,
while high effort yields high value of output,  = . The costs of exerting
high effort to the agent are  while exerting low effort is, for reasons of
convenience but without loss of generality, assumed not costly. To make the
problem interesting, we assume−    0 and−  Π+ , where Π 
0 and   0 are the principal’s and the agent’s outside options, respectively.
These assumptions imply that if players could write complete contracts, and
if they are neither altruistic nor spiteful ( =  = 0), they would contract on
high effort. Our assumption that   0 could be interpreted as a situation
where the agent performs various regular tasks such that, even though the
agent would exert low effort, he would still bring value to the firm. We
7The same approach is taken by Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Bernheim and Stark
(1988).
8Unless otherwise stated, all variables are defined on a per-period basis.
9For a thorough exposition of when interdependent utility functions form a unique
system and can be defined on underlying utility drivers instead of some person’s utility,
see Bergstrom (1999).
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deliberately do not put a restriction on the value of low output as compared
to the outside option utilities ( R  +Π). The principal’s outside option Π
reflects the value of not employing the agent; the agent’s outside option  is
the value of not being employed by the principal. Π and  are independent of
player’s type, which has three implications. First, the pair ( ) is specific
to this relationship and thus does not reflect players’ general altruistic or
spiteful attitudes. Second, the social relationship vanishes if the players do
not contract with each other (anymore). Third, Π and  can be interpreted
as including the expected quality of social relationships that would result
when being matched to some other player.
The second important ingredient of the model is that effort and output
can only be assessed subjectively, and hence contracts that condition effort or
output are not enforceable in court. Any contract that includes compensation
or punishment that is conditional on effort or output must therefore be self-
enforcing. This can only hold in a repeated interaction setting. The model
therefore includes an infinite number of periods, where players discount utility
from future periods by a constant common factor . The self-enforceability
of relational contracts depends further on the punishments inflicted upon
the principal when she does not keep a promise or carry out a threat when
the contract calls her to do so. Many models assume that the agent plays a
trigger strategy that prescribes to break off trade when the principal reneges
(e.g. Bull 1987, MacLeod and Malcomson 1989 and 1998, and Levin 2003).
Following Baker et al. (1994), we do not impose that the agent always leaves
the firm after contract breach. Instead we assume that after contract breach
the agent will never believe any promise or threat in the future anymore.
Note that because this is a dynamic game of complete information, we solve
for the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game.10
The order of the game within a period is as follows. First, the principal
chooses whether or not to hire the agent. Second, if the agent is hired, the
players bargain over a contract which may contain a contractible base salary
(), a promise to pay a bonus () in case of high output, and a threat of
dismissal in case of low output.11 Without loss of generality, the outcome of
10One could argue that, if the principal employs more than one agent, she could over-
come a possible credibility problem by using a tournament (see Carmicheal 1983a, 1983b,
Malcomson 1984, 1986, and Kragl 2011). While this may resolve the principal’s problem of
credibly committing to pay a bonus, multiple agents introduce a new credibility problem
in the assignment of the bonus. That is, the principal will be tempted to award prizes to
the agents she likes most rather than to the best-performing agents.
11Throughout the paper, we abstract from the use of severance pay (or bonds). Sever-
ance pay leaves the credibility of bonus pay unaffected (MacLead and Malcomson 1989).
However, negative severance pay (that is, contracting on a transfer from the agent to
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contract negotiations are assumed to be given by generalized Nash bargain-
ing, as in Cordero Salas (2011).12 Third, if a contract is agreed upon, the
agent chooses an effort level. Fourth, output is realized and observed by both
players. The principal decides whether or not to pay the bonus, and payoffs
are realized. After that, a new period starts. By not rehiring the agent in
this new period, the principal can exercise a threat of dismissal.
Typically, repeated games have many non-stationary equilibria. As is
usual in the literature, we focus on stationary equilibria, that is, the principal
and agent agree to the same contract every period.13 Also, we assume that
the contract only contains a particular type of incentives if necessary and
credible.
4 Analysis
In this section we solve the model described above. We start by deriving
the first-best contract and analyze how it is affected by social relationships.
Most of these properties will be shown to also apply to relational contracts
which are derived and discussed afterwards. We finish with characterizing
optimal relational contract design for any pair ( ).
4.1 Complete Contracts
In this subsection we assume players can write complete contracts which
consist of an effort level  and the agent’s compensation . Since effort is
contractible, there is no need for incentives. If the principal decides to hire
the agent, players enter into negotiations over the content of the contract.
Generalized Nash bargaining states that the outcome of negotiations is given
by the solution to
max

Φ ≡ £Π ( )−Π¤1− £ ( )− ¤ , (1)
the principal in case the principal dismisses the agent) can be used to make a threat of
dismissal credible.
12For an extensive discussion on how bargaining affects relational contracts, see Cordero
Salas (2011).
13By Levin (2003)’s argument, stationary contracts are optimal because they can give the
agent the same incentives as any non-stationary compensation plan. This holds because in
this model future rents and a bonus are perfect substitutes. Also note that the credibility
of the bonus is unaffected by the choice whether to use future rents or a bonus (see the
discussion of MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) in Section 2). Finally, the credibility of a
threat of dismissal is independent of the issue of (non-)stationarity, as will become clear in
the next section. Hence, any complex compensation plan can be replicated by a stationary
one, maintaining the agent’s incentives and the credibility of the contract.
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subject to the players’ participation constraints
Π ( )−Π ≥ 0 and  ( )−  ≥ 0. (PC , PC)
If the players fail to reach an agreement, then they receive their outside
option utilities. The agent’s bargaining power is represented by 0    1.
Note that in the extreme case where  = 0, the principal has the power to
make the agent a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Also note that players never leave
money on the table because all output that is not transferred to the agent in
the form of compensation automatically accrues to the principal.
The first-order condition of Φ to  yields, after some rewriting, the shar-
ing rule:
 ( )− 
Π ( )−Π =
1− 
1− 

1− 
. (2)
Substituting  ( ) and Π ( ) and rewriting to  yields the agent’s total
compensation level:
∗ () = 1
1− 
£
(1− ) + −  ()
¤
+ (3)

1− 
(1− ) (1− )
£
 ()− − (1− ) − (1− )Π¤ ,
which is discussed in detail at the end of this subsection. Given that the
agent’s compensation equals ∗ (), both players’ participation constraints
reduce to
 () ≡  ()− − (1− ) − (1− )Π ≥ 0, (PC , PC)
where  () denotes the surplus from the relationship. The first-order con-
dition (2) reveals why both players’ participation constraints are identical:
bargaining implies that players divide the surplus of the relationship propor-
tional to players’ bargaining power. Hence, all that matters for participation
is whether the relationship yields a non-negative surplus. It also follows that
the agent earns a rent from employment for any  ()  0. Furthermore,
for any positive surplus, the agent’s compensation, and thereby the agent’s
utility, are increasing in his bargaining power, as in Cordero Salas (2011).
Finally, under complete contractibility, if players enter into a contract, they
will evidently contract on high effort as it maximizes the surplus  () by our
assumption that  −   .
Independent of the effort level contracted upon, social relationships af-
fect the complete contract in three ways. Most of these results also apply to
relational contracts as will be shown in the next subsection. First, note that
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the first-order condition (2) reveals that the share of surplus allocated to a
player is decreasing in his altruism intensity. The reason is that a player’s
altruism increases the weight the other player’s utility gets in determining
the surplus from the relationship. A more altruistic player therefore effec-
tively loses some bargaining power. However, second, the players’ (identical)
participation constraints (PC , PC) reveal that a player is better off when
he is more altruistic. The reason is that good social relationships imply an
altruistic benefit of working together which increases the surplus from the
contract. Hence, even though a more altruistic player earns a smaller share
of surplus, he nevertheless enjoys a higher utility level. It follows directly that
a player is also better off when the other player is more altruistic. Further,
note that players may not enter into a contract if social relationships are
too bad. This may happen when either one or both players are sufficiently
spiteful. Contracts may then entail a social cost which is not compensated
for by the economic surplus from the employment relationship.
Third, social relationships give rise to a compensating wage differential.
Using (3), it is straightforward to derive that the agent’s compensation ∗ ()
may increase or decrease in his altruism, depending on :
∗ ()
 = − (1− )
1
(1− )2
£
 ()−  − (1− )
¤
+ 

1− Π R 0.
In the extreme case where the agent has no bargaining power at all, his
compensation decreases in . The intuition is that the principal extracts
all the surplus from the relationship. As the agent enjoys more altruistic
utility, the principal extracts this utility by decreasing the agent’s pay. In
the other extreme where  = 1, it is the agent who extracts all rents from the
relationship. Whether the agent can extract more utility from the principal
if he becomes more altruistic then depends on the principal’s feelings. If the
principal is spiteful, she dislikes working with a more altruistic agent (simply
because the agent enjoys more utility when more altruistic) and so she must
be compensated; hence ∗ () decreases in  if  = 1 and   0. On the
other hand, if the principal is altruistic, she enjoys employing a more altruistic
agent and so ∗ () increases in  if  = 1 and   0. A similar but reverse
intuition can be provided for the impact of the principal’s altruism on the
agent’s compensation which is given by
∗ ()
 = − (1− )

1−  + 
1
(1− )2
£
 ()−  − (1− )Π¤ R 0,
the sign of which also depends on , and on the sign of . We summarize
the above results in the following Lemma.
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Lemma 1 If contracts are complete and players are not too spiteful, then
players enter into a contract specifying high effort. Moreover, and indepen-
dent of the effort level contracted upon:
- the agent earns compensation ∗ () as described by (3) which yields
him a rent.
- a more altruistic player earns a smaller share of surplus, but,
- both players enjoy greater utility if either player is more altruistic.
Social relationships also imply a compensating wage differential, the sign
of which depends on the agent’s bargaining power. Lastly, if either one or both
players are too spiteful, the participation constraint may be binding, implying
that players do not contract.
4.2 Relational Contracts
In the previous subsection we assumed that through contracting the play-
ers can commit to create and divide the surplus as negotiated ex ante. In
practice, contracts are often incomplete. This gives rise to two moral haz-
ard problems. First, the agent may profitably deviate from the negotiated
contract by choosing to shirk rather than work. If so, the agent must be
given incentives (a bonus and/or threat of dismissal) that make shirking un-
profitable. But then, second, the principal may deviate by withholding a
promised bonus or not dismiss an agent after shirking. Hence, it must hold
that any incentive that is used is credible. In the following we establish when
incentives are needed, when they are credible, and what type of incentives
are optimally used to prevent the agent from shirking. Finally, note that
there are no profitable deviations if players decide to contract on low effort.
Hence, such a contract, is self-enforcing and pays the agent compensation
∗ ( = 0) as described by (3).
4.2.1 Credibility of Incentives
A threat of dismissal is only credible when the principal is willing to fire the
agent if he is caught shirking. Recall that if a contract contains a threat of
dismissal and the agent is nevertheless retained after shirking, he will never
believe a threat or promise in the future anymore. Hence, if the agent is
retained after he is caught shirking, the agent will forever shirk. Therefore, a
threat of dismissal is credible only if the principal is better off dismissing the
agent than retaining the agent knowing that he will shirk, Π ≥ Π (∗  = 0).
This condition is the reverse of the participation constraint with  = 0:
 ( = 0) ≡ − (1− ) − (1− )Π ≤ 0. (CC)
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It is easy to verify that the principal’s utility from a low-effort contract is
increasing in the quality of social relationships as measured by  and .
The intuition is that good social relationships entail an altruistic benefit of
working together. Hence, the principal is not willing to fire the agent if social
relationships are sufficiently good. As a result the credibility of dismissal is
undermined by good social relationships. This is our first key result.
Proposition 1 Good social relationships undermine the credibility of a threat
of dismissal.
The other non-contractible part of the contract is a promise to pay a bonus
for high output. For the bonus to be credible, it must be in the principal’s
interest to pay it conditional on observing high output. Adhering implies
that the principal must incur bonus costs in the present, but she retains the
opportunity to implement credible incentives in the future. Focussing on the
relevant case where the agent exerts high effort, the principal’s lifetime utility
from adhering is, by stationarity:
Π = 1
1− 
1
1−  [ − − +  (+ − )] .
Reneging on the bonus has the benefit of saving on bonus costs. However,
the cost is that incentives are no longer credible in the future, implying the
agent will shirk. Assuming the principal prefers to fire the agent if he shirks
( ( = 0) ≤ 0), the principal’s lifetime utility from reneging is:
Π = 1
1−  [ − +  (− )] +

1− Π.
Consequently, a bonus is credible if Π ≥ Π, which can be written as

1− 
£Π (   = 1)−Π¤− 1− 
1−   ≥ 0. (CC)
Similarly, if the principal prefers to retain the agent after contract breach
( ( = 0)  0), credibility of the bonus (CC0) is guaranteed if

1−  [Π (   = 1)−Π (
∗  = 0)]− 1− 
1−   ≥ 0. (CC
0
)
The credibility constraints essentially state that paying a bonus is only cred-
ible when doing so yields sufficient rents in the future. Therefore, the cred-
ibility of a bonus increases in the principal’s discount factor . Further, it
can be easily derived that the credibility of the bonus increases in the agent’s
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altruism. Assuming a threat of dismissal is credible, and the agent earns
total compensation equal to ∗ ( = 1) as is shown to be always the case in
the next subsection, one can derive:
CC
 =
 (1− )
1− 
1
(1− )2
"
 −  − (1− ) + (1− )
2 
1−  Π
#
 0,
where the sign follows if participation is ensured. The intuition follows di-
rectly from Lemma 1. If the agent is more altruistic, the value of the re-
lationship increases. Some of this value is allocated to the principal in the
contract negotiations. It follows that the principal has stronger incentives to
uphold the relational contract if the agent is more altruistic. The same holds
when the principal is more altruistic:
CC
 =
 (1− )
1− 
1
(1− )2
"
 −  + (1− )
2 
1−   − (1− )Π
#
 0.
The reason is that, as above, an increase in the principal’s altruism increases
the principal’s rents from the relationship. In addition, a more altruistic
principal experiences lower costs from paying a bonus, as she internalizes
part of the benefit of the bonus to the agent. The same results hold if a
threat of dismissal is not credible.14 Hence, our second key result is:
Proposition 2 Good social relationships reinforce the credibility of a promise
to pay a bonus.
14Derivating CC
0
 yields:
CC
0

 =
 (1− )
1− 
1
(1− )2
( −  − )  0,
and
CC
0

 =
 (1− )
1− 
1
(1− )2
( −  − )  0.
The intuition behind these comparative static results is slightly different from the one in
the main text. The reason is that the principal’s utility from reneging is not her outside
option utility, but the utility from the low-effort contract. By Lemma 1, the principal’s
utility from a contract increases in both players’ altruism, independent of the effort level.
However, as the principal’s utility rises faster with altruism under the high-effort contract
compared to the low-effort contract, better social relationships make it more attractive to
the principal to adhere to the bonus also if a threat of dismissal is not credible.
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4.2.2 The Optimal Relational Contract
Next consider the agent’s incentive compatibility constraint. The agent is
only willing to exert high effort if doing so yields higher expected lifetime
utility than shirking does. Let’s first suppose the contract contains a credible
threat of dismissal. Then, keeping fixed the principal’s strategy to adhere to
a promise of a bonus, the agent’s lifetime utility from exerting high effort is,
by stationarity:
 = 1
1− 
1
1−  [+ −  +  ( − − )] .
The agent’s lifetime utility from shirking is
 = 1
1−  [+  (− )] +

1−  .
Shirking implies that the agent does not bear any effort costs. However, the
agent does not receive a bonus. In addition, the agent is fired after shirking
so that his continuation utility is equal to his outside option utility. It is
optimal for the agent to exert high effort if  ≥  (IC), which becomes
after some rewriting
1− 
1−  +

1− 
£
 (   = 1)− 
¤
+

1−  ( − ) ≥
1
1− .
The right-hand side denotes the agent’s costs of exerting high effort. The
left-hand side describes the benefits from exerting high effort which may be
threefold: a bonus, a stream of future rents, and intrinsic joy of enriching the
principal. Clearly, shirking can be made unprofitable by promising a bonus
and/or by providing future rents in combination with a threat of dismissal.
Assuming that the agent’s compensation equals +  = ∗ ( = 1) as de-
scribed by (3) (which we prove always to be the case in the proof of Propo-
sition 4), the minimum required bonus to induce high effort can be written
as:
∗ = 1
1− 
∙
 −  ( − )− 
1− 
1− 
1−   ( = 1)
¸
, (IC)
where  ( = 1) is described by (PC , PC) with () =  and  = 1. It
is easy to verify that the minimum required bonus ∗ is decreasing in both
players’ altruism. The reason is twofold. First, a more altruistic agent experi-
ences more altruistic utility from enriching the principal. Second, by Lemma
1, the contract becomes more valuable to the agent if either player becomes
more altruistic. Hence, provided that the contract contains a credible threat
of dismissal, a lower bonus is required.
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Next suppose that a threat of dismissal is not credible and, hence, is not
part of the contract. Then, the agent’s effort choice does not affect his future
employment status. The reason is that the principal will retain the agent in
any case. The implication is that the agent’s future rents can no longer be
used as an incentive device. Consequently, the agent only takes the current
costs and benefits of effort into account and exerts high effort if  ≥ 
(IC
0
). Rewriting yields that the minimum required bonus is given by:
∗∗ = 1
1−  [ −  ( − )] . (IC’)
For sufficiently strong agent’s altruism, incentives are unnecessary to induce
high effort. This is the case when  ≥ − . It follows directly that the
optimal relational contract in this case is simply a flat wage contract without
threat of dismissal. By Nash bargaining, the agent’s total compensation
equals ∗ ( = 1) as derived above. Our next Proposition follows.
Proposition 3 Sufficiently altruistic agents ( ≥ −), do not need in-
centives to exert high effort. In this case the optimal contract is a contract
without incentives that results in high effort. The agent’s total compensation
equals  = ∗ ( = 1) and so Lemma 1 also applies to this contract.
Next we derive the optimal relational contract assuming that the agent
needs incentives to exert high effort. The results are given in Proposition 4
and derived and explained in detail in the subsequent proof.
Proposition 4 If the agent needs incentives to exert high effort, the optimal
relational contract is described by the following Table:
ToD credible ToD not credible
a) ToD,  ≥ ∗,  = 1
Bonus credible b) ToD, flat wage,  = 1 No ToD,  ≥ ∗∗,  = 1
c) no ToD,  ≥ ∗∗,  = 1
Bonus not credible No contract No incentives,  = 0
where ToD denotes threat of dismissal. Cases (b) and (c) may apply in
addition to case (a) only if respectively the agent’s and the principal’s future
rents are sufficiently large (see condition (4) and (5) below). Further, the
agent’s total compensation always equals +  = ∗ () and so Lemma 1 also
applies to these relational contracts.
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Proof. First, in the case where neither credibility constraint binds, any
incentive scheme is credible and so the contract can always induce high effort.
By Nash bargaining the agent’s compensation is given by +  = ∗ ( = 1)
which, by Lemma 1, yields the agent a rent. Given that the agent earns
a rent, any bonus  ≥ ∗ as described by (IC) combined with a threat of
dismissal ensures high effort (Case (a)). However, there are potentially two
alternatives, depending on the size of the players’ rents. If the value of the
agent’s future rents is sufficiently high, then a threat of dismissal alone can
induce high effort (Case (b)). This holds when:

1− 
£
 (∗  = 1)− 
¤
≥ 1
1−  [ −  ( − )]  (4)
If the value of the principal’s future rents is sufficiently high, a bonus contract
with  ≥ ∗∗ and no threat of dismissal can also induce high effort (Case (c)).
This holds when:

1− 
£Π (∗  = 1)−Π¤ ≥ 1− 
(1− ) (1− ) [ −  ( − )]  (5)
Hence, if either condition (4) or (5) holds, the players have various contract
types at their disposal to induce high effort. Note that both conditions hold
for the same values of  and  if  = 12 . However, if  
1
2
condition (5)
binds for lower values of  and , whereas otherwise condition (4) binds for
lower values of  and .
Second, consider the case where promising a bonus is credible while
threatening with dismissal is not. Then, it is still possible to contract on
high effort because any necessary bonus can be promised. By Nash bargain-
ing, the agent’s compensation is given by  +  = ∗ ( = 1), where it must
hold that  ≥ ∗∗ as described by (IC’).
Third, if neither incentive is credible, it is not possible to induce high
effort. However, if the threat of dismissal is not credible, it is by definition
attractive to hire the agent even if he shirks. The agent is paid compen-
sation resulting from Nash bargaining,  = ∗ ( = 0) as described by (3).
Hence, a flat wage contract without threat of dismissal is agreed to when
both incentives are not credible.
The final case is that where a threat of dismissal is credible but the
minimum required bonus, ∗, is not. Since the threat of dismissal is credible,
it is by definition not attractive to contract on low effort. An argument
similar to that of MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) proves that the principal
does not find it attractive to contract on high effort either, and so no contract
is agreed to at all. The argument runs as follows.
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The credibility constraint for bonus pay, given that the threat of dismissal
is credible, can be rewritten as
 ≤  ≡ 
µ
1
1−  ( − )−
1− 
1−  Π− 
¶
, (CC)
where  is the maximum credible bonus. Since   ∗, the maximum credible
bonus  is too low to satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). The
only way to satisfy (IC) then is to increase the agent’s rents by raising the
agent’s total compensation above ∗ ( = 1). Even though this will result
in a division of rents that is different from the division implied by Nash
bargaining, it may still make the principal better off compared to the case
where no contract is agreed to. However, the following argument shows that
this is not the case. First note that the impact of increasing the base salary
on the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) is zero if (CC) is met with
equality:
IC
 =
1− 
1− 

 +

1− 
1− 
1− 
µ
1 +


¶
= 0
where, following (CC),  = −. The reason is that increasing the base
salary makes the contract less profitable to the principal, and hence the maxi-
mum credible bonus decreases. Therefore net incentives from raising the base
salary do not increase until the maximum credible bonus equals zero. Fur-
ther, if the principal can only credibly promise a bonus that is equal to zero,
it must hold that she earns no rent from the contract, Π (  = 0  = 1) = Π.
Moreover, the principal must still increase the base salary in order to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint (IC). But this violates the principal’s
participation constraint and so she will not enter into a high-effort contract.
4.3 Social Relationships and Contract Selection
So far we have found that players may agree to different types of relational
contracts. Players may find it optimal to include both incentive types, either
one of them, or no incentives at all (see Propositions 3 and 4). Which contract
type is optimal depends on the need for and credibility of incentives. This is
in turn affected by the quality of social relationships as described by the pair
( ) (see Propositions 1 to 3). In this subsection we investigate what type
of contract is selected for any pair ( ). Naturally there are many different
contract mappings, depending on the exact parameterization of the model.
However, there is one important qualitative distinction between the different
mappings: either better social relationships always increase the value of the
18
Figure 1: Contract selection as a function of social relationships.  = 21,
 = 1,  = 07,  = 058, Π = 041,  = 03, and  = 075.
relationship, or they may reduce it sometimes. We start with illustrating the
first case in Figure 1, which has the following properties.
First, social relationships must be sufficiently good to satisfy the players’
participation constraints. Naturally, PC( = 0) lies to the right of PC( = 1)
as output is lower in the low-effort contract.
Second, high effort is only sustainable if neither player wants to deviate
from a high-effort contract. Above the line  = − the agent has sufficient
intrinsic motivation to exert high effort without incentives. Hence, above this
line the optimal contract is a contract without incentives that results in high
output (Proposition 3). Below the line  = − , incentives are required to
induce high effort which must be credible. PC( = 0) demarcates whether
the principal finds it attractive to hire the agent if he shirks. Therefore to
the right of PC( = 0) social relationships are too good to make credible use
of a threat of dismissal (Proposition 1). Next, depending on the credibility
of a threat of dismissal, the principal must promise the agent a bonus equal
to at least ∗ or ∗∗ to induce high effort. Hence, if a threat of dismissal is
credible, the credibility constraint for bonus pay becomes

1− 
£Π (∗  = 1)−Π¤− 1− 
1−  
∗ ≥ 0, (CC)
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whereas otherwise it is

1−  [Π (
∗  = 1)−Π (∗  = 0)]− 1− 
1−  
∗∗ ≥ 0. (CC0)
The reason that CC and CC
0
 are evaluated at ∗ and ∗∗ is that players
can always lower the bonus to this level, without changing total compensa-
tion, which would be optimal if a higher bonus is not credible.15 Hence the
constraints denote when promising some bonus that induces high effort is
feasible. Also note that whenever the agent needs incentives to exert high
effort, CC lies strictly to the right of PC( = 1). The reason is that the
principal requires a rent to be able to credibly promise a bonus.
Third, at CC the relationship is exactly that valuable such that the
principal can promise the bonus ∗ which, in combination with a threat of
dismissal, induces high effort from the agent (Proposition 4, case a). As we
move to the north-east, social relationships improve, and so by Lemma 1
both players’ rents increase. Therefore, at some point it holds that either the
principal’s or the agent’s rents are equal to the agent’s costs of effort. This
point is determined by either equation (4) or (5) and graphically represented
by the fat line. If the agent’s rents equal his cost of effort, an efficiency
wage contract without bonus pay induces high effort (Proposition 4, case b).
Alternatively, if the principal earns sufficiently high rents, she can credibly
promise a bonus that alone induces high effort (Proposition 4, case c). As it
is also possible to use both tools instead of only one, several contract types
are optimal beyond the fat line till CC. The model’s predictions concerning
contract type are therefore indeterminate in this region.16
Fourth, anywhere beyond CC, a threat of dismissal is not credible, but
the bonus ∗∗ is credible and so the optimal contract is a bonus contract that
induces high effort. However, ∗∗ may not always be credible beyond CC
as we will see in Figure 2.
Figure 2 again represents the mapping from social relationships to con-
tract type, but now for a lower value of the discount rate. This shifts the
bonus credibility constraints to the right as better social ties are required to
make the bonus credible. The crucial difference between Figures 1 and 2 is
that there is now an intermediate region where neither incentive is credible.17
By Proposition 4, players then agree to a contract without incentives that
results in low effort.
15It can also be easily checked that promising ∗ and ∗∗ becomes more credible if social
relationships improve.
16In Figure 1 (and Figure 2) the fat line represents equation (5). So, to the right of the
fat line players can choose to only use a bonus.
17Such a region also emerges for a sufficiently high value of the agent’s bargaining power
().
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Figure 2: Contract selection as a function of social relationships. Same
parameterization as above, except  = 06.
To understand why the principal loses the possibility to promise a bonus
for some pairs ( ) beyond CC, consider the following. If a threat of dis-
missal is no longer credible, this reinforces the credibility problem concerning
the bonus. The reason is two-fold. First, the principal’s fallback utility from
reneging is no longer her outside option utility but her utility from a low-
effort contract. By definition the latter is weakly higher than the former if a
threat of dismissal is not credible, and so the principal has weaker incentives
to stick to her promise to pay a bonus. Second, if a threat of dismissal is
not credible, the agent’s rents cannot be used as an incentive device and
so the minimum bonus must increase from ∗ to ∗∗. This again gives the
principal stronger incentives to withhold the bonus. For high values of  it
is never a problem that the bonus must increase from ∗ to ∗∗ because the
present value of adhering to the principal is still large enough, as in Figure
1. However, for low values of  the principal’s present value of adhering is
low, and so a discrete increase in the bonus has a relatively large impact on
the credibility constraint. Hence the non-credibility of a threat of dismissal
may put too much strain on the promise to pay a bonus.
The optimality of a low-effort contract for intermediate levels of altruism
implies two counterintuitive comparative static results. First, at the credi-
21
bility constraint of a threat of dismissal, a marginal improvement in social
relationships is harmful to productivity and players’ utility in equilibrium.
The reason is that, at CC, a marginal improvement in social relationships
renders a threat of dismissal non-credible, and hence, players lose the op-
portunity to credibly contract upon high effort. Second, near the credibility
constraint for bonus pay (CC
0
), better social relationships do not lead to
lower bonuses as commonly found in the literature (Sliwka 2007, Shchetinin
2010, and Non 2012), but rather higher. The reason is that better social
relationships enable credible use of a bonus. We summarize these results in
our final Proposition.
Proposition 5 Depending on the parameterization of the model, a region
may exist where players agree on a low-effort contract without incentives.
Starting from this low-effort contract, it may hold that a deterioration of
social relationships leads to higher productivity and higher players’ utility
while an improvement in social relationships can result in higher bonuses.
5 Concluding Remarks
The theoretical analysis in this paper yields some clear testable implications.
In particular, our analysis predicts that a threat of dismissal is less likely
used as an incentive device when social relationships improve. Conversely,
social relationships facilitate subjective bonus pay arrangements and, at some
point, make incentives redundant. Laboratory experiments are potentially
very effective in testing contract selection as a function of social relationships.
In this type of experimenting, the researcher has the freedom to fine-tune
the profitability of the various types of contracts, which is hard outside the
lab. Moreover, in contrast to the field, one can easily observe when players
decide not to enter into a contract. A bottleneck may be to bring feelings
of altruism and, particularly, feelings of spite into the lab. This difficulty
may be resolved by recruiting subject pools in which social relationships are
already present. One could think of members of (non-)rivalrous sports clubs
or student associations. Using field data, one can test whether there is a
relationship between contract types and the quality of social relationships
between manager and employee.
Theoretically, there are potential avenues for future research as well.
First, it would be interesting to endogenize the emergence of vertical social
relationships in the workplace. Dur (2009), Englmaier and Leider (2012),
and Non (2012) have taken some steps in this direction in static frameworks.
Building on Rabin (1993), Englmaier and Leider (2012) assume that an em-
ployee cares more about his manager’s payoff when the manager leaves a rent
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to him. If such reciprocal motivations are sufficiently strong, it is optimal
for the manager to leave a rent and provide weak monetary incentives, thus
reducing the risk premium that needs to be paid to the employee. In Dur
(2009) and Non (2012), manager’s altruism is not observed and employees
are conditionally altruistic, as in Levine (1998). Managers therefore have
an incentive to credibly signal their altruism through gift-giving. The most
efficient way to do so is to provide benefits that are otherwise underprovided
(e.g., attention, as in Dur 2009), or to mute incentives and increase the base
salary, as in Non (2012).
Second, it could be interesting to study how an opportunity to use ob-
jective performance measures at some cost affects optimal contract selection.
Objective performance measures are likely used when subjective performance
contracts fail; that is, when social relationships are mediocre. However, as in
Baker et al. (1994), there may be further implications, because the opportu-
nity to use costly objective performance measures may affect the principal’s
incentives to renege on subjective performance pay.
Lastly, the model can be extended to include multiple principals and
agents and matching. Yang (2008) has recently developed such a general
equilibrium model, abstracting from social relationships.
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